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Abstract
This paper describes a statistical sample design to measure portfolio-at-risk in
microfinance. It applies the design to the microfinance portfolio of Banco do Nordeste in
Brazil.  Statistical audit sampling requires no special knowledge of statistics and is
useful for due-diligence inspections by possible creditors, possible owners, or in
preparation for the possible securitization of a portfolio. The sample design here
stratifies by branch and by loan officer because errors in the record of arrears in the
management-information system are likely to vary along these dimensions. Because
errors may also vary by loan size and are more costly for large loans than for small
loans, loans are sampled with probability proportional to size. This implicitly stratifies
the sample by amount outstanding. Furthermore, the design samples all of the largest
loans and all rescheduled loans. Given these strata, given a definition of portfolio-at-
risk (for example, the outstanding balance of all loans with at least one payment at
least one day overdue), given a desired upper bound on the accuracy of the estimated
proportion of the portfolio-at-risk (for example, 2 percentage points), and given a
desired precision for the confidence interval (for example, 90 percent), the paper tells
(a) how many cases to draw; (b) how to estimate the proportion of the portfolio-at-risk;
and (c) how to estimate the dollar amount of the portfolio-at-risk.
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1. Introduction
An audit of the measurement of risk in a microfinance portfolio checks whether
arrears as reported in the electronic management-information system (MIS) match
arrears as recorded in physical files. Such audits are useful to potential creditors and to
the microfinance lender itself as well as to potential owners or to potential buyers of a
securitized portfolio.
Audits often use sampling techniques to inform judgements about the accuracy
of MIS records without the expense of an exhaustive review of all physical files of all
loans. The trade-off is that sampling measures are less exact than exhaustive measures.
Statistical sampling quantifies the nature of the trade-off. Compared with exhaustive
samples or non-statistical samples, statistical samples require fewer resources to check
physical records, but they also require more resources to prepare a sample design and
to compute measures of the confidence and precision of its estimates of portfolio-at-risk.
This paper describes the design of a statistical sample to estimate the proportion
of portfolio-at-risk in the microfinance portfolio of Banco do Nordeste in Brazil. Given
desired levels of confidence and precision, it tells how to divide the portfolio in strata,
how many cases to draw, and how to estimate the proportion of the portfolio-at-risk as
well as the amount of dollars at-risk. Strata are defined along dimensions where errors
are likely and/or costly: the branch, the loan officer, the loan size, and rescheduled2
status. Many have written about statistical sample design for audit purposes (e.g., Guy
et al., 1997; Carmichael and Benis, 1991; Roberts, 1978; Smith, 1976 and 1974; Knight,
1974; Arkin, 1963), but no one has addressed the case most relevant for microfinance,
that is, estimation of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk with multiple strata, with
probability proportional to size, and with exhaustive sampling of multiple strata.
This paper lays out such a sample design. The fundamental formulae (although
not their combination) come from the classic text by Cochran (1977). General formulae
are presented here to facilitate adaptation for different microfinance portfolios. The
general formulae are applied to the microfinance portfolio of Banco do Nordeste in
Brazil. The arithmetic is tedious, but it can be programmed in a spreadsheet.
The rest of the paper presents tells how to estimate portfolio-at-risk in
microfinance through statistical audit sampling. Section 2 discusses the logistics of
sampling with probability proportional to size. Section 3 describes stratification,
estimation, and sampling by the four strata of rescheduled loans, large loans, loan
officers, and branches. Section 4 discusses trade-offs in the choice of sample size.
Section 5 concludes with specific recommendations for the case of Banco do Nordeste.3
2. Sampling with probability proportional to size
The design calls for samples not of loans outstanding but rather of dollars
outstanding. This is known as sampling with probability proportional to size or dollar-
unit sampling (Anderson and Teitlebaum, 1973). Loans have different amounts
outstanding (sizes), and the proportion of portfolio-at-risk most directly depends not on
the number of delinquent loans but rather on the number of delinquent dollars. If the
sampling unit were loans, then small loans would have the same chance of being
sampled as large loans even though large loans influence portfolio-at-risk much more.
2.1 Clustering
Of course, dollars outstanding (and physical files) are clustered in loans.
Furthermore, the definition of portfolio-at-risk in microfinance is that all dollars
outstanding in a loan are at-risk if one dollar is (Christen, 1997). Thus, the optimal
design samples loans with probability proportional to the amount of dollars
outstanding. Large loans are more likely to be sampled, but all dollars outstanding
have the same likelihood of being sampled.
The estimation of the precision of the estimated proportion of portfolio-at-risk
must account for the perfect positive correlation in risk status among all dollars in a
loan. The techniques described below account for this correlation induced by the4
clustering of dollars in loans. Failure to do this would lead to overstatements of the
precision of the estimates of portfolio-at-risk and thus to smaller-than-required sample
sizes and too-tight upper bounds (Deaton, 1997).
2.2 Drawing the sample
Suppose that b indexes branches, l indexes loan officers in a given branch, and i
indexes loans for a given loan officer. Given the portfolio (excluding rescheduled and
large loans) of a single loan officer, a simple, efficient way to draw the sample with
probability proportional to size is to assign to each loan a uniformly distributed random
number bli that ranges between zero and unity and then to multiply bli by the amount
of dollars outstanding in the loan Ybli to produce bli:
bli  bliYbli. (2)
Next, arrange the loans in descending order by bli. Renumber the loans so that
loan bl1 has the highest bli, loan bl2 has the second-highest bli, etc. Then check the
physical loan files of the first nblO cases, where nblO is the sample size for loan officer bl,
determined as described below. (All rescheduled and large loans will also be checked.)5
2.3 What data to collect
To compute estimates of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk for Banco do
Nordeste, the auditors will need a file with the following fields for each loan in the
microfinance portfolio (not only for sampled loans):
• A unique identifier for the loan;
• A unique identifier for the borrower;
• The branch;
• The loan officer;
• Date of disbursement;
• Amount disbursed;
• Amount outstanding as of the date of the audit;
• Date that the most recent payment fell due;
• Date that the most recent payment was made (pulled from physical files);
• Days in arrears according to the MIS;
• Amount due in the most recent payment;
• Whether the loan is rescheduled or not.6
3. Stratification and estimation
This section presents the notation and formulae to compute measures of the
proportion of portfolio-at-risk and the amount of dollars at-risk for a design that uses
dollar-unit sampling, that stratifies by branch and loan officer, and that exhaustively
samples rescheduled and large loans.
3.1 The overall portfolio
Let Y be the amount outstanding in the portfolio, and let N be the number of
loans outstanding. As of June 30, 2000, the microfinance portfolio at Banco do Nordeste
had 44,581 loans, and their book value was 22,494,262 cruzeiros, or, given an exchange
rate of about 1.8 cruzeiros per dollar, 12,496,812 dollars. (From now on, monetary
figures are in units of dollars; the statistical formulae are invariant to this choice.) The
amount outstanding per loan was about $280.
Let y be the amount of dollars outstanding in loans with at least one payment at
least one day overdue. According to the MIS at Banco do Nordeste, y was $849,972.
The value of the outstanding portfolio Y is assumed correct as reported by the MIS; the
sample audit checks the value of the portfolio-at-risk y in the physical files.7




At Banco do Nordeste, the MIS estimate of p was about 6.8 percent (0.068). The
main objective of the audit is to check the accuracy of the MIS estimate of p. The
computation of the sample size required to achieved given levels of desired confidence
and precision, however, depends on the true value of p, but, before the audit, the true
proportion is unknown. The design here follows standard practice in that it takes the
MIS proportion of the portfolio-at-risk as the best available pre-audit estimate.
3.2 Strata
The sample design stratifies by loan officer and by branch. Within a loan-officer
stratum, it also stratifies loans into three types: rescheduled, large, and “other”.
Stratification by branch and loan officer serves two purposes. First, portfolio-at-
risk probably varies between different branches and between different loan officers.
Stratification can take advantage of this to reduce the variability of the estimates of the
proportion of the overall portfolio-at-risk, although the gain in precision is probably
small (Cochran, 1977; Smith, 1976). Second and more important, stratification helps to
pinpoint branches or loan officers whose audited portfolio-at-risk differs greatly from
the MIS portfolio-at-risk. Lenders may want to investigate such discrepancies further.8
3.2.1 Branch
Denote the number of branches as B (79 for Banco do Nordeste). The index to
the branch is b, so the number of loans in the b
th branch is Nb. Likewise, the amount of
dollars outstanding in branch b is Yb. At Banco do Nordeste, Nb ranges from 31 to
2,833 (average 564), and Yb ranges from $7,273 to $725,280 (average $284,737).
3.2.2 Loan officer
Let NL be the number of loan officers (257 for Banco do Nordeste). The sample
design assumes that a given loan officer is in only a single branch. Let the number of
loan officers in branch b be NbL, and let the index to loan officers in a branch be l.
Thus, the notation bl identifies an individual loan officer. Including rescheduled and
large loans, the number of loans outstanding under loan officer l in branch b is Nbl. At
Banco do Nordeste, Nbl ranges from 4 to 505 (average 173).
The amount of dollars outstanding (including dollars in rescheduled and large
loans) for loan officer bl is Ybl, and the amount of dollars in loans found to be in arrears
by the audit is ybl. At Banco do Nordeste (including dollars in rescheduled and large
loans), Ybl ranges from $358 to $149,336 (average $48,625).
3.2.3 Individual loans
The index to individual loans in the portfolio of a loan officer is i, with a range
from 1 to Nbl. The number of cases “other” loans (excluding rescheduled and large
loans) sampled from the portfolio of loan officer bl is nbl. The amount of dollars9
outstanding in the i
th “other” loan of the l
th loan officer at the b
th branch is Ybli, and the
amount of dollars found by the audit to be in arrears is ybli. That is, ybli is Ybli if the
audit test finds that loan bli is delinquent, and zero otherwise:
ybli 
Ybli if loan bli is delinquent,
0 otherwise
. (3)
3.2.4 Large and rescheduled loans
The design calls for exhaustive sampling of all rescheduled loans and all large
loans because these strata are likely sources of costly errors. Rescheduled loans are
exhaustively sampled for two reasons. First, rescheduled loans are more likely than
non-rescheduled loans to become delinquent. Second, microfinance lenders, branch
managers, and/or loan officers may want to obfuscate the delinquency of rescheduled
loans so as to hide their mistakes in the choice to reschedule.
Large loans are also exhaustively sampled for two reasons. First, large loans are,
all else constant, more likely to become delinquent because they have larger
installments and offer greater implicit rewards to default (Schreiner, 1999). Second,
large loans contribute disproportionately to value-at-risk.
For loan officer bl, let NblR be the number of rescheduled loans, and let NblG be
the number of large loans. Likewise, let YblR be the dollar amount outstanding in
rescheduled loans, and let YblG be the dollar amount outstanding in large loans. Finally,
let yblR be the dollar amount of rescheduled loans revealed by the audit to be at-risk,10
and let yblG be the dollar amount of large loans revealed by the audit to be at-risk.
(Banco do Nordeste does not have rescheduled loans, but the general formulae are
presented here anyway because most microfinance portfolios do have them.)
3.3 Proportion of portfolio-at-risk
The point estimate pbl of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk for a loan officer has
three components: rescheduled loans, large loans, and other loans.
3.3.1 Proportion of rescheduled portfolio-at-risk





This quantity is of interest because it is one component of the overall portfolio-
at-risk of a given loan officer, but it is also of independent interest; extraordinarily high
values may signal that a loan officer does not choose wisely which loans to reschedule.





Because rescheduled loans are exhaustively sampled, NblR equals nblR, and the
variance vblR is zero. Exhaustive sampling removes all sampling variation. Thus,11
confidence bounds are moot for estimates of pblR; all rescheduled loans are sampled, so
all repeated sample would produce the same estimate.
Let sblR stand for the standard error of the estimate of the proportion of
portfolio-at-risk. It is the square root of vblR, or zero.
To compute the proportion of all rescheduled loans at-risk, define wblR as the




















The variance and standard error of pR is zero.
3.3.2 Proportion of large portfolio-at-risk





Extraordinarily high values may signal to the microfinance organization that a
given loan officer does not judge the risk of large loans well.12
The variance of pblG (denoted vblG) is zero because all large loans are sampled.
The standard error sblG is also zero. No confidence bounds are needed.
To compute the proportion of the portfolio of large loans at-risk, define wblG as




















The variance and standard error of pG is zero.
3.3.3 Proportion of other portfolio-at-risk
The estimation of the portfolio-at-risk for other loans (excluding rescheduled and
large loans) is more complex because not all loans are sampled and because dollars
cluster in loans. Recall that nblO loans are drawn into the sample with probability
proportional to size, that Ybli is the amount outstanding, and that ybli is the amount13
revealed by the audit to be in arrears. Then an estimate of the portfolio-at-risk for











Cochran (1977) notes that this estimate is inconsequentially biased.
The need to account for clustering produces a long, complex formula for the


























This variance is not zero because other loans are not exhaustively sampled so
NblO exceeds nblO. The standard error sblO is the square root of vblO.
To compute the proportion of the portfolio of all other loans at-risk, define WblO






























The variance vO can be used to compute confidence bounds analogously to the
manner described below for confidence bounds at the level of the loan officer, branch, or
overall portfolio.
3.3.4 Proportion of portfolio-at-risk for a given loan officer
The overall proportion of portfolio-at-risk for a given loan officer combines the
estimates of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk for rescheduled loans, large loans, and











The estimate of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk for the entire portfolio of a
given loan officer pbl is then (Cochran, 1977):
pbl  WblRpblR  WblGpblG  WblOpblO. (17)15
As usual, the microfinance organization may wish to look closer at loan officers
with very high pbl.
The estimates of pblR, pblG, and pblO are all unbiased, so the estimate of pbl is also
unbiased. Furthermore, these estimates are all independent because they are drawn








The standard error sbl of pbl is the square root of the variance vbl:
sbl  vbl. (19)
3.3.5 Upper bounds on proportion of portfolio-at-risk for a loan officer
What is the likelihood that the estimate of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk for
a given loan officer pbl is not understated due to sampling variation? Given t, the
number of standard deviations from the mean of a Normal distribution that places a
probability of 1 in the upper tail, define dbl as the distance from the point estimate
pbl to an -percent upper bound (Cochran, 1977; Arkin, 1963):
dbl  tsbl. (20)
Now ubl is an -percent-confidence upper bound on pbl, where:
ubl  pbl  dbl. (21)16
As an example based loosely on numbers close to those likely to be relevant for
Banco do Nordeste, suppose  is 90 percent, implying that t is 1.281. Suppose further
that an average loan officer has Nbl=173 loans in the portfolio (nbl=80 of which were
sampled), that the point estimate pbl is 0.068, and that vbl is 0.000792, so sbl is 0.02814.
Then dbl is 0.036. This means that the point estimate of pbl will be less than
ubl=0.068+0.036=0.104 in 90 percent of repeated samples.
In audits of portfolio-at-risk in microfinance, a one-sided upper bound on the
point estimate is more appropriate than a two-sided interval on both sides of the point
estimate. There are two reasons for this. First, a one-sided upper bound of size 
requires a smaller sample than a two-sided interval of size 2. Second, auditors (e.g.,
Carmichael and Benis, 1991; Elliott and Rogers, 1972) and potential creditors or owners
of a microfinance organization are much more concerned with the understatement of
risk than with the overstatement. Of course, a focus on a one-sided upper bound does
not preclude also computing a two-sided interval ex post.
3.3.6 Amount of dollars at-risk
Given an estimate of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk for a loan officer pbl, an
estimate of the amount of dollars at-risk Pbl is (Cochran, 1977):
Pbl  Yblpbl. (22)17




The standard error of Pbl (Sbl) is the square root of Vbl. Let Dbl be the distance
from the point estimate Pbl to an -percent upper bound:
Dbl  tSbl. (24)
The -percent upper bound Ubl is then:
Ubl  Pbl  Dbl. (25)
In the example, Pbl is $48,6250.068=$3,306. The variance of Pbl is $1,872,674,
the product of the square of Ybl ($48,626) and vbl (0.000792). The standard error Sbl is
$1,368. Given a desired precision of 90 percent, t is 1.281 and Dbl is $1,753. A 90-
percent upper bound on the amount of dollars at-risk Pbl is Ubl, or
$3,306+$1,753=$5,059. In this case, the true amount of dollars at-risk does not exceed
153 percent of the figure reported by the MIS with 90-percent certainty.
3.4 From loan officers to branches
The formula for the proportion of portfolio-at-risk pb at the branch level (and the
formulae for other related measures) are constructed from the loan-officer estimates.
Recall that the amount of dollars outstanding in the portfolio of a loan officer l in18
branch b is Ybl and that the amount of dollars outstanding in the branch is Yb. The

















The standard error sb is the square root of vb. The size of an -percent upper
bound on pb is db:
db  tsb. (29)
The -percent confidence bound on pb is then ub:
ub  pb  db. (30)
An estimate of the amount of dollars at-risk Pb at a branch is:
Pb  Ybpb. (31)19




The standard error of Pb is Sb, the square root of Vb. Let Db be the distance
from the point estimate Pb to an -percent upper bound:
Db  tSb. (33)
The -percent upper bound Ub is then:
Ub  Pb  Db. (34)
3.5 From branches to the overall portfolio
The formula for the proportion of portfolio-at-risk p for the overall portfolio (and
the formulae for other related measures) are constructed from the branch estimates.
Recall that the number of branches is B and that the amount of dollars in the portfolio

















The standard error s is the square root of v. The size of an -percent upper
bound on p is d:
d  ts. (38)
The -percent confidence bound on p is u:
ub  pb  db. (39)
An estimate of the amount of dollars at-risk P in the overall portfolio is:
P  Yp. (40)
The variance of P is V:
V  Y
2v. (41)
The standard error of P is S, the square root of V. Let D be the distance from
the point estimate P to an -percent upper bound:
D  tS. (42)
The -percent upper bound U is then:
U  P  D. (43)21
4. Sample size
Arkin (1963) says that the choice of the optimal sample size has five steps:
• Choose a confidence level  for the upper bound (for example, 90 percent);
• Choose a size d for the upper bound (for example, 2 percentage points);
• Guess the proportion of the portfolio-at-risk before sampling (for example, the
MIS estimate);
• Count the population size (for example, the MIS figure);
• Compute the sample size using standard formulae.
At least three factors make the choice of the optimal sample size less
straightforward than this simple list would suggest. First, budgets are limited. Sampling
is useful precisely because it promises to reduce costs by reducing the number of files
that must be pulled. Often, the optimal sample size costs too much.
Second, the confidence level  and the size of the upper bound d are not chosen
in a vacuum. Rather, these choices depend on the one hand on the budget and on the
other hand on the cost of a mistaken judgement from an underestimate due to sampling
variation. For example, if the cost of underestimating portfolio-at-risk is very high, then
a large sample is needed to narrow the confidence bounds.
Third, there are no formulae to compute optimal sample sizes in all but the
simplest cases. There are formulae for simple random samples (Cochran, 1977), for22
single levels of stratification (Roberts, 1978), for clustered samples (Cochran, 1977),
and for dollar-unit sampling (Smith, 1977), but there are no formulae for four strata,
two exhaustive and two with dollar-unit sampling and clusters.
4.1 Conservative optimality
In practice, the choice of the (sub-optimal) sample size starts with the (optimal)
sample size for the lowest strata, the loan officer. Sample sizes for higher-level
strata—the branch and the overall portfolio—are aggregates of sample sizes in lower-
level strata. The result is a sample size that I call conservatively optimal. It is optimal
because, at the lowest strata, it is computed from standard formulae for a given upper
bound and level of confidence. It is also conservative because, in higher strata, it
exceeds the requirement for a given upper bound and confidence level. This happens
because the required sample size increases with the population size at a decreasing rate.
(In the design proposed here, the number of cases in higher strata are even more
conservative because the lower strata include exhaustive samples of rescheduled and
large loans and because of the use of dollar-unit sampling.)
4.1.1 An example
For a simple random sample from the portfolio of loan officer bl, computing the
optimal sample size nblO requires an MIS estimate pb
*
lO of the proportion of the portfolio-
at-risk for non-rescheduled, non-large loans, a desired size of the upper bound dblO, the23
factor tblO based on a desired confidence level blO, and the number of loans NblO



















For example, suppose that branch b at Banco do Nordeste has two loan officers,
one with an Nb1O of 173 (the portfolio average) and one with an Nb2O of 300. For both,
pb
*
lO is 0.068. With a 2-percentage-point upper bound with 90-percent confidence, dblO is
0.02 and tblO is 1.281. For the first loan officer, nb1O is 103.87, or, after conservatively
rounding upward, 104. For the second loan officer, nb2O is 140. Thus, the optimal
sample size increases from 104 to 140 as the population size increases from 173 to 300.
The share of the portfolio sampled, however, decreases (from 60 percent to 47 percent)
as the population size increases.
Now suppose that the sample estimates of the proportion of portfolio-at-risk (pb1O
and pb2O) revealed by the audit are 0.06 and 0.08. Suppose further that equation 12
gives vb1O as 0.0002184 and vb2O as 0.0002824. Ignoring rescheduled and large loans and
supposing that all loans are the same size, the strata weights Wb1 and Wb2 are 0.3658
and 0.6342. The proportion of portfolio-at-risk for the branch pb is then
0.36580.06+0.63420.08=0.073 (equation 17). The variance vb is
0.3658
20.0002184+0.6342
20.0002824=0.0001428 (equation 18), and the standard error24
sb is 0.01195. The size of a 90-percent upper bound on pb is 1.2810.01195=0.015
(equation 20), so the upper bound itself is 0.073+0.015=0.88 (equation 21).
Thus, sampling to achieve a 2-percentage-point upper bound in the loan-officer
strata leads to a 1.5-percentage-point upper bound in the branch strata. This is the
essence of conservative optimality; sample sizes optimal for given upper bounds in the
lowest strata lead to smaller upper bounds in higher strata.
4.1.2 Rescheduled and large loans
All rescheduled loans are sampled. The sample size for large loans depends on
how large is large. The choice may derive from an arbitrarily set number of loans
and/or from natural breaks in the loan-size distribution. For Banco do Nordeste, the set
of large loans will probably include 300 to 1,000 cases.
4.2 Factors that affect sample size
4.2.1 Algebraic
The formula for the optimal number of cases for a simple random sample
(equation 44) highlights several factors that affect sample size. First, the required
sample size increases with the guessed proportion of the portfolio-at-risk. Second, the
required sample size increases with the size of the population, but at a decreasing rate.
Third, more precision requires bigger samples, both because the required sample size25
increases as the width of the upper bound decreases and because the required sample
size increases as the desired level of confidence increases.
Of these three factors, the guess for the proportion of the portfolio-at-risk is
derived from the MIS and is beyond the control of the auditor. The size and confidence
level of the upper bound are more malleable, and these are normally chosen based on
budget constraints and on the likely cost of mistakenly understating portfolio-at-risk.
4.2.2 Non-algebraic
At least four other factors also affect the required sample size, given the desired
size and confidence in the upper bound. First, stratification can increase or decrease the
required sample size. Unless the proportion of portfolio-at-risk varies greatly among
strata (and it probably does not in microfinance portfolios), stratification by branch
and loan officer increase the required sample size. Although the required sample size
increases with the size of the population, it increases at a decreasing rate. Thus, the
sum of the sample sizes for lower-level strata exceeds the sample size that would be
required for a higher-level stratum on its own. For example, without strata and without
clusters, the proportion of portfolio-at-risk for the microfinance portfolio at Banco do
Nordeste could be estimated with an 90-percent upper bound of 2 percentage points
with only about 259 cases (equation 44, assuming p
* is 0.068 and N is 44,581). Stratified
at the loan-officer level and assuming that each of the 257 loan officers has a pb
*
l of
0.068 and an Nbl of 173 (the portfolio averages), the total required number of cases is26
257104=26,728. (Of course, the upper bound on the estimated proportion of the overall
portfolio-at-risk with this many cases is very tight.) In short, strata can be expensive in
terms of sample size. To get samples within budget may require either fewer strata or
wider upper bounds and/or lower confidence levels in lower-level strata. The choice
depends on the objectives of the audit, the budget constraints, and the cost of
understating risk. In particular, precise estimates of the risk of the overall portfolio do
not require very large sample sizes.
Second, dollar-unit sampling decreases the required sample size. This technique
preserves the virtues of random sampling but concentrates the effort of pulling physical
files on larger loans, thus boosting the share of dollars outstanding checked in a given
number of pulled files. On the other hand, dollars are clustered in loans—that is, all
dollars in a loan have the same at-risk status—and this dampens the reduction in
sample size due to dollar-unit sampling. On net, however, dollar-unit sampling
decreases the sample size required for a given upper bound and level of confidence.
Unfortunately, the need to account for clustering means that it is impossible to solve for
the optimal sample size in the lowest-level stratum nblO in the formula for the variance
vblO (equation 12). The use of equation 44 as a second-best practical solution
conservatively overstates the required sample size.
Third, exhaustive sampling of restructured and large loans increases sample size.
Still, exhaustive sampling makes sense if mistakes in the MIS record of arrears may27
differ systematically between rescheduled loans, large loans, and other loans. Dollar-
unit sampling obviates at least some of the gains from exhaustive sampling of large
loans because many of these loans would have been sampled anyway.
Fourth, for a given level of confidence , two-sided intervals require more cases
than one-sided bounds. One-sided bounds make sense for microfinance audits because
understatements of arrears are much more dangerous than overstatements.
In summary, most audits of microfinance portfolios probably will use one-sided
confidence bounds, dollar-unit sampling, and exhaustive sampling of rescheduled and
large loans. The main adjustments in specific audits are the desired upper bound and
confidence level and/or the use of stratification by branch or loan officer. The next
section discusses trade-offs among these choices.
4.3 Trade-offs in choices of sample size
As pointed out above, a simple random sample of the overall portfolio with
about 259 cases could serve to estimate the proportion of portfolio-at-risk with 90
percent confidence of not understating the true proportion by more than 2 percentage
points. The addition of branch and/or loan-officer strata boost the required number of
cases by one or two orders of magnitude. The size of the upper bound and the level of
confidence also strongly influence sample size.28
4.3.1 Level of confidence
In practice, the level of confidence for the upper bound  is almost always 90
percent. The shift to 95 percent increases sample size a lot (shown below) but adds
little strength to the measure of confidence. More important, few people are satisfied
with 95-percent confidence but unsatisfied with 90 percent. Despite devastating
critiques (McCloskey and Ziliak ,1996; McCloskey, 1985; Cowger, 1984), convention
dictates that the lowest credible level of confidence is 90 percent. Although confidence
levels of 80 percent or even 70 percent are good enough for government work (in the
absence of other knowledge, even 51-percent confidence is useful), no one questions
whether 90 percent is adequate, but many insist that 80 percent is inadequate.
4.3.2 Size of upper bound
The upper bound must be narrow so that the estimated proportion of portfolio-
at-risk is not useless, but it must also be wide so as to accommodate budget constraints
on sample size. Increases in the upper bound increase sample size at an increasing rate
(Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 1 and 2; Cochran, 1977).
The size of the upper bound depends on the proportion of portfolio-at-risk
reported by the MIS and the level of risk considered dangerous. If the MIS proportion is
very low (say, 1 percent) and a portfolio-at-risk of 5 percent is not dangerous, then an
upper bound that spans four percentage points might not be too wide even though it
implies that the sample audit cannot rule out a risk four times as great as that reported29
by the MIS. On the other hand, a microfinance lender whose MIS reports a portfolio-at-
risk of 5 percent might not be considered creditworthy if the audit sample cannot rule
out a portfolio-at-risk of 9 percent (almost double what the MIS reports).
In some cases, it may be useful to compare the upper bound on portfolio-at-risk
with annual profits or with annual provisions for loan losses. The goal of such a
comparison is to get a rough feel for the possible cost of mistakenly understating risk.
Given that the true proportion of the portfolio-at-risk in microfinance if often
between 2 and 10 percent, confidence bounds of 2 or 3 percentage points will often be
appropriate. Smaller bounds may require too many cases, and larger bounds may be
too fuzzy to inform judgements.
4.3.3 Stratification by branch and loan-officer
Trade-offs between levels of confidence, size of bounds, and number of strata
depend on the specifics of a given microfinance portfolio. This section and the next
discuss these trade-offs in terms of Banco do Nordeste. The specific tables and figures
here do not apply to other microfinance portfolios, although of course the main concepts
and the approach to the investigation of trade-offs are valid in general.
4.3.3.1 Calculations
Given stratification by loan officer, Figure 1 and Table 1 show how the required
sample size varies with the level of confidence  and with the size of the upper bound
dbl. Sample sizes were computed by applying equation 44 to the MIS-reported portfolio-30
at-risk pb
*
l for each of 273 loan officers and then summing to get the overall sample size
n. Each pb
*
l was computed from the loan-officer-specific portfolio outstanding Ybl and
from the MIS-reported portfolio-at-risk ybl. Both Ybl and ybl include loans in arrears past
90 days, as well as current loans and loan with arrears between 1 and 90 days.
Optimal sample sizes for loan officers with very low MIS-reported arrears can be
very small, even reaching zero for those with no reported arrears. To ensure that some
loans are sampled for each loan officer, any pb
*
l below 0.03 is set at 0.03. All the loans of
some loan officers are sampled because non-exhaustive samples do not achieve the
desired precision. As discussed above, the sample-size calculation does not adjust for
the exhaustive sampling of rescheduled and large loans nor for dollar-unit sampling.
Thus, the figures in Table 1 are conservative in that upper bounds derived from the
audit will probably, for a given level of confidence, be a bit tighter than required.
4.3.3.2 Results
Stratification by loan officer requires large sample sizes. For example, 90-percent
confidence with an upper bound of 2 percentage points for the estimated portfolio-at-
risk for each loan officer requires a sample of almost 20,000 cases, or about 44 percent
of the overall portfolio (Figure 1 and Table 1).
To shrink the upper bound by 1 percentage point (given 90-percent confidence)
would require an additional 13,000 cases. To expand the upper bound by 1 percentage
point would reduce the sample by about 7,000 cases, and to expand it by two31
percentage points would cut an additional 4,000 cases. The desired size of the upper
bound has a strong influence on the required sample size.
The desired level of confidence also has a strong influence. For example, with the
upper bound fixed at 2 percentage points, a 95-percent confidence level requires almost
25,000 cases, a 90-percent level requires almost 20,000, 80 percent requires about 12,000
cases, and 70 percent requires about 6,000 cases.
4.3.4 Stratification by branch
The sample-size calculations for stratification by branch are identical to those for
stratification by loan officer, but equation 44 is applied to 79 branches rather than to
273 loan officers. The results are in Figure 2 and Table 2. This sample design ensures a
given level of precision for the measurement of risk at the level of branches, but it does
not ensure anything for risk measurements at the level of loan officers.
Compared with stratification by loan officer, stratification by branch requires
fewer cases—the curves in Figure 2 are below and to the right of those in Figure 1. The
number of loans outstanding in the portfolio of a branch Nb exceeds the number of
loans outstanding in the portfolios of any of its individual loan officers Nbl, so the
required sample at a branch nb is larger than the required sample for any of its
individual loan officers nbl. The sample size nb for the branch on its own, however, is
less than the sum of the sample sizes nbl for the loan officers at the branch.32
Changes in the desired size of the upper bound have little effect as long as the
bound is less than 2 percentage points. Thus, a bound of 2 percentage points might be
an efficient use of sample size.
Trade-offs between levels of confidence are large. With the size of the upper
bound fixed at 2 percentage points, 95-percent confidence requires about 15,000 cases,
90-percent confidence requires about 11,000 cases, 80-percent confidence requires about
6,000 cases, and 70-percent confidence requires about 3,000 cases. Even in the absence
of loan-officer strata, the sharp trade-off between sample size and confidence remains.33
5. Conclusion
Statistical audit sampling can help potential lenders, potential owners, and
potential buyers of securitized portfolios to cross-check the accuracy of MIS measures of
portfolio-at-risk. The sample design described here accounts for many of the unique
features of microfinance portfolios. It samples with probability proportional to loan size,
and it exhaustively samples rescheduled loans and large loans. The design also stratifies
by branch and/or by loan officer. Although the math is tedious, it is straightforward to
implement on a spreadsheet. Increased precision of measurement and reduced cost
make statistical sampling a worthwhile audit tool.
5.1 Options for Banco do Nordeste
With no stratification by branch or loan officer, 90-percent certainty that the
true proportion of the portfolio-at-risk does not exceed the estimated proportion by
more than two percentage points requires a sample of 259 cases. With stratification by
branch, it requires about 11,000 cases; with stratification by loan officer, it requires
about 20,000 cases. Exhaustive samples of rescheduled and large loans add about 500 to
1,000 cases to these figures.
If stratification by branch is attractive because the budget will not support more
than 10,000 cases, a good option is to stratify by loan officer anyway but to reduce the34
desired confidence and/or to increase the size of the bound. Any level of precision with
the branch as the basic strata can be achieved with the loan officer as the basic strata
without losing the gains to stratifying by loan officer. For example, rather than a
confidence level  of 90 percent with an upper-bound size d of 0.0233 at the branch
level (with a required n of 8,746), the auditors could set  at 80 percent and d at 0.0233
at the loan-officer level (with a required n of 8,142). For most branches—although
probably not for all—this technique will achieve levels of precision for  and d very
close to the desired levels while producing greater overall precision and greater
knowledge of the accuracy of the measurement of arrears at the level of the loan officer.
Even with 1,000 rescheduled and large loans, n is still less than 10,000 and quantitative
statements about the accuracy of the MIS can be made for all loan officers, for all
branches, and for the overall portfolio.
The estimates of the required sample sizes here are conservative. In practice,
stratification and dollar-unit sampling will lead to the achievement of the desired
bounds and levels of confidence with a smaller n. Before drawing the sample, however,
it is impossible to know exactly how much smaller n could be.
In a pinch, a sampling plan based on 5,000 cases—for example, that with  as 80
percent and d as 0.0367 under loan-officer stratification—and an additional 1,000
rescheduled and large loans might achieve 90-percent confidence for an upper bound of
2 percentage points at the branch level. At the loan-officer level, of course, confidence35
would be lower, and bounds wider. At the level of the overall portfolio, any random
sample with more than 300 cases will achieve this level of precision.
5.2 A dynamic sampling plan
A final, sophisticated option is to compute measures of precision as sampling
takes place, stopping once a desired level is reached. Given a spreadsheet to implement
the formulae in this paper and a level of confidence, upper bounds could be checked at
the end of each day’s audit. Files would be pulled until precision was satisfactory for all
loan officers, for all branches, and/or for the overall portfolio. Furthermore, sampling
for specific branches or loan officers could be stopped as soon as desired bounds and
confidence were reached within those strata.
With such daily checks, cases would have to be pulled in a specific, costly
manner. In particular, auditors would have to pull—assuming stratification by loan
officer—one case for each loan officer before they drew a second case for any loan
officer. (A better but perhaps more difficult-to-implement plan would maintain a
constant ratio of cases drawn to nbl across all loan officers.) Furthermore, cases would
have to be pulled in a specific order. For each loan officer, the loan with the highest bli
would have to be drawn first, then—after the loan with the highest bli had been drawn
for all other loan officers—the loan with the second-highest bli would be drawn, and so
on. Auditors could not, for example, pull all the files sampled for a given loan officer at36
once nor do anything else that might reduce costs but that might also process cases in
some order other than that indicated by bli.
Logistics issues may also preclude a plan with daily checks. For example, the
microfinance lender may store physical files in the branches that disbursed the loans. If
the number of branches exceeds the number of auditors, then auditors, once they pull
one file for each loan officer in a given branch, would have to travel to the next branch.
This quickly could become more costly than sampling a fixed number of cases.37
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Table 1: Required sample sizes with stratification by loan officer
Size of upper bound
0.0033 0.0067 0.0100 0.0133 0.0167 0.0200 0.0233 0.0267 0.0300 0.0333 0.0367 0.0400 Confidence
43,287 40,302 36,321 32,109 28,130 24,578 21,496 18,869 16,622 14,727 13,097 11,725 95 percent
42,598 38,105 32,727 27,623 23,232 19,601 16,643 14,260 12,319 10,712 9,406 8,317 90 percent
40,465 32,500 25,050 19,325 15,129 12,088 9,839 8,142 6,854 5,846 5,051 4,411 80 percent
35,755 23,712 15,832 11,072 8,116 6,198 4,887 3,939 3,281 2,757 2,348 2,019 70 percent
Source: Calculations by the author.
Table 2: Required sample sizes with stratification by branch
Size of upper bound
0.0033 0.0067 0.0100 0.0133 0.0167 0.0200 0.0233 0.0267 0.0300 0.0333 0.0367 0.0400 Confidence
41,221 34,359 27,644 22,162 17,868 14,634 12,206 10,268 8,734 7,509 6,505 5,693 95 percent
39,406 30,411 22,884 17,438 13,527 10,753 8,746 7,214 6,041 5,114 4,362 3,773 90 percent
34,686 22,618 15,096 10,593 7,771 5,905 4,620 3,710 3,035 2,536 2,137 1,833 80 percent
26,835 13,972 8,213 5,317 3,742 2,745 2,060 1,627 1,314 1,084 917 778 70 percent
Source: Calculations by the author.